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CONTRACT AND CONVEYANCE IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
JOHN D. FALCONBRIDGE
PART Two
IV.

BORDER LAND BETWEEN CONTRACT AND CONVEYANCE

i. Lex Situs Different from ProperLaw
Stated broadly, the problem now to be discussed is, what is the result
if a transaction contains both contractual and conveyancing elements, 1 and
the proper law of the contract is the law of one country and the law governing the conveyance of the chattel (the lex situs) is that of another country? The solution of the problem, broadly stated, would appear to be that
the contractual effect of the transaction is governed by the proper law of the
contract and the property effect by the lex situs; and that in case of conflict
the former law must yield to the latter, or, in other words, the contractual
rights and liabilities of the parties under the proper law of the contract can
be enforced only in so far as they are consistent with the recognition of the
property rights existing or created under the lex situs.
Under the Conflict of Laws Restatement, if the contract is made in one
country and relates to a chattel situated in another country, the proper law
of the contract is necessarily different from the law governing the property
in the chattel. In stating this I am assuming that Sections 353 and following of the Restatement, which provide that the validity and effect of a contract are governed by the law of the place of making, apply to a contract
relating to a chattel. Sections 372 and following specifically provide for a
contract relating to land as distinguished from a conveyance of land, and,
in the absence of corresponding provisions as to a contract relating to a chattel, it may be presumed that2 such a contract is governed by the rules applicable to contracts generally.
So, under English law, if a chattel is situated in one country and a contract relating to it is made in another country, it may happen (depending on
the other circumstances) that the proper law of the contract is different from
the lex situs. On the other hand, under English law, but not under the ReAs to contract and conveyance in the conflict of laws, see the references in Part One,
published last month, at 662n. In the course of the present section reference will be made
also to some writers of continental Europe.
2Itwould seem to be far-fetched to argue from § 226A ("as used in the Restatement
of this subject, property denotes rights in relation to a thing")t that a contract relating to

a chattel (and therefore credting "rights in relation to a thing") is intended to be included
under property rather than contract. In fact the expression "property" simply (as defined
by § 226A) is almost immediately abandoned in favor of "rights in" land (§§ 228A, 22gA),
property in" a thing (§§23oA, 231) and "rights in" a thing (§§232, 233, 234), and the
sections with regard to conveyance do not refer to property or to rights in relation to a thing,
but refer to the conveyance of an "interest in" land (§ 236 if.) and to the conveyance of
a chattel or to an "interest in" a chattel or the "title to" a chattel (§ 275 if.).
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statement rule, if the situs of the chattel and the place of making of the
contract are the same, it may conceivably happen that the proper law of the
contract is different from the lex situs. And what may happen under English law may of course happen under the law of a state of the United States
if effect is not there given to the Restatement rule.
If, for example, a chattel is situated in one country, and an offer with
regard to it is accepted in another country, the lex situs and the proper law
of the contract will necessarily be different under the Restatement rule, and
may be different under the English rule. Again, if the situs and the place
of making of the contract are one country, but delivery and payment are to
be made in another country, the law of the former country will under the
Restatement rule govern both property and contract, whereas under English
law it is probable that the proper law of the contract will be held to be different from the lex situs.
2. Transaction in one Country and Recognition of its Effect in Another
Country
As regards the property effect of a transaction the Conflict of Laws
Restatement, Section 280, provides:
Title to a chattel acquired in accordance with the law of the state
in which the chattel was situated at the time when the title was acquired
is recognized in a state into which the chattel is subsequently brought.
Returning to the broad statement already made that the law governing
the conveyance of property (the lex situs) must prevail over the proper law
of the contract, if they conflict, we may attempt to classify the situations in
which the conflict between the two laws may arise. We may suppose a
transaction taking place in X between A, the owner of a chattel situated
there, and B, omitting for the moment any question of a further transaction
between B and a third person, C. (i) If by the lex situs, the effect of the
transaction between A and B is that the property in the chattel passes absolutely to B, then B has a good title elsewhere, without regard to the effect
of the transaction by the proper law of the contract. (2) So, if by the lex
situs, the property passes to B in some qualified sense or subject to some
property right on A's part, again it would seem that whatever may be the
property rights which A and B respectively retain or acquire, those property
rights are entitled to recognition elsewhere, without regard to the effect of
the transaction by the proper law of the contract (even if by that law an
absolute title or no title, as the case may be, passes to B). (3) Lastly, if by
the lex situs the transaction is regarded as purely contractual, transferring
no property right of any kind to B, it would seem that effect must be given
to the negation of B's title by the lex situs without regard to the effect of
the transaction by the proper law of the contract (even if by that law B
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would otherwise get either a qualified or an absolute title). In any of these
cases, however, effect is to be given to the proper law of the contract so far
as that is consistent with recognition of the title of A or B, as the case may
be, existing or created under the lex situs; though it may be conceded that
the distinction between the property effect and the contractual effect of the
transaction between A and B usually becomes important only by reason of
some other transaction between A or B, as the case may be, and some third
party who claims to have acquired or retained the title. Furthermore, the
reported cases usually relate only to the property aspect, if there is one, either
because it happens that the contractual aspect is clear, or because, as so often
happens when two innocent parties are claiming the ownership of one thing,
the intermediate party who has dealt with both of them is financially worthless, so that the contractual rights of either of them against him are not worth
litigation.
There may of course be various kinds of reasons why under a contract
of sale or other transaction between A and B no title will pass to B. If
the le: situs is English law or a law based upon English law, the reason
why no title passes to B under a contract of sale may be that the subject
matter is not in existence (e. g., a chattel to be manufactured by A for B: future goods), or that the subject matter is not specific (e. g., a contract for sale
by description: unascertained goods), or that the subject matter is not owned
by A (whether it is a case of future goods-a chattel to be procured by Aor simply a case of A's purporting to sell a chattel which he does not own) ;
or the reason why no title passes to B may be that even though the subject
matter is specific and is owned by A (conditions precedent to the passing
of the title to B), the contract is executory in its nature (e. g., a conditional
sale or other contract to sell) and is not a present sale. If the leox' situs is not
English law or a law based on English law, there may be still other and
different reasons why the title does not pass, (as, for example, that there
has been no delivery of possession, and therefore that the transaction operates by way of contract only and not as a conveyance). We are not, however, concerned with the reasons, but must accept whatever the lex situs
tells us is the property effect of the transaction.
Conversely, the transaction between A and B may be a contract of sale
under which by the law of X, where the chattel is situated, the property
passes at once to B without formal conveyance and without delivery of possession; or the transaction may be one by which A, retaining possession of
the chattel, transfers under the law of X a special or qualified property in it,
as, for example, by way of security or for some special purpose.
If we now suppose, in any of the situations just outlined, that the chattel is removed from X to Y, and consider further the question of the recognition in Y of the property effect of the transaction which took place in
X, two possible limitations should be mentioned.
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(a) If, for example, by the law of X the property or some partial or
qualified property right has passed from A to B, without delivery of possession of the chattel, the ordinary operation of the rule that B's title is entitled to recognition in Y may be prevented by the fact that the transfer of
the title in the circumstances would not only be ineffective if the transaction
had taken place in Y, but by a rule of public policy of Y is also regarded
as ineffective even in the case of a transaction which took place in X while
the chattel was situated there. 3 The commonest example of the foregoing
limitation on the recognition in Y of a title acquired in X is the case of a
chattel mortgage validly created in X without delivery of possession, and
the subsequent removal of the chattel to Y, the law of which refuses to
recognize the mortgagee's title. 4
(b) In the converse case it has been said that the recognition in the
new situs of a property right established under the law of the former situs
is subject to a limitation, namely, that if the conditions required by the law
of the former situs for the constitution of a property right have not been
completely fulfilled at the time of the change of situs, it is the law of the new
situs which decides what effect is to be given to the state of facts existing at
the time of the change.5 Consequently, if a transaction takes place in X
relating to a chattel situated there, and if by the law of X the title does not
pass from A to B, then when the chattel is removed to Y, the law of Y becomes applicable so as to cause the title to pass to B, if by the law of Y a
similar transaction taking place in Y would have had the effect of conferring
the title on B.
It is submitted, however, that the limitation just stated cannot be admitted. If, for example, by the law of X the effect of a transaction which
takes place between A and B relating to a chattel situated there is that no
property passes to B, that is to say, if the transaction is regarded as being
purely contractual or executory by the law of X, and under the law of X
the property in the chattel is still in A, it seems clear that A's property right
established by the law of X is entitled to recognition in Y, and consequently
that the denial of B's property right by the law of X is entitled to recognition in B. If, according to the suggested limitation now under discussion, the mere contract under the law of X were transformed into a conveyance of the chattel under the law of Y upon the removal of the chattel
to Y, on the ground that the law of Y becomes applicable for the purpose
of defining the property effect of the transaction, and that under the law
of Y a similar transaction would have the effect of a conveyance, the
8 See also infra p. 827 et seq.
'5 See case (A2) infra p. 833.
This appears to be Zitelmann's doctrine, adopted by Lewald (1930) 7
Dlorr INTERNATIONAL, 374,
PRIVAIRECHT (1931) 187-189,
TRECHT (1929) 45, 46.

RPERTOME DE
DAs DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE
249; cf. 2 FRANKENSTEIN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVA-

375, §284ff.;

§§ 248,

and in
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result would be that contrary to principle the law of Y would refuse to
recognize A's property right retained or established under the law of X.
When the law of X says that the property has not passed from A to B,
it necessarily says that the property remains in A, and this ascertainment of
the ownership of the chattel by the then lex situs would seem to be as much
entitled to recognition in Y, as, admittedly, the title ascertained by the law
of X would be entitled to recognition in Y in the converse case of the transaction being regarded by the law of X as a conveyance from A to B. It
would seem also to follow that if by the law of X the transaction has the
effect of transferring to B some partial or qualified title, the respective property rights of A and B ascertained by the law of X are entitled to recognition in Y.
3. Effect of Subsequent Transactionin New Situs
We may next suppose that the transaction between A and B is followed
by a transaction between A or B on the one part, and C, on the other, under
which C claims to have acquired the property in the chattel. If at the time
of both transactions the chattel is situated in the same country, the result is
comparatively simple; the lex situs governs the property effect of both transactions. If, however, the situs of the chattel is changed in the interval between the two transactions, being in X at the time of the first transaction
and in Y at the time of the second transaction, the situation is more complicated. The first transaction is governed as to its property effect by the law
of X, and as to its contractual effect by the proper law of the contract, and
the second transaction is governed as to its property effect by the law of Y
(subject to the possible modification already discussed 0 in case the chattel
has been removed from X to Y without the owner's consent), and is governed as to its contractual effect by the proper law of the contract. Full
recognition must be given to the property effect of the second transaction
under the law of Y, and if that law gives a good title to C, his title is entitled to recognition in X notwithstanding that he would not have got a good
title by the law of X in the event of both transactions being governed by the
law of X. In other words, a title acquired or retained under the law of X
by virtue of the first transaction may be defeated or rendered nugatory under
the law of Y by the second transaction. The law of X which was the governing law so long as it was the lex situs and by virtue of its being the lex
situs, obviously must yield to the law of Y with regard to the property effect
of any transaction which has taken place since the removal of the chattel
to Y.

7

See Part One, published last month, at 675 ff.
The same principle prevails, broadly speaking, in other systems of conflict of laws.
See, e. g., Niovar, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (Paris, 1928)' § 511, at 638;
Lewald, supra note 5, at 373, § 282; and in DAs DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT
(1931) 185, § 247.
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The conditional sale and chattel mortgage cases afford of course the
widest variety of illustration of the operation of the rules just stated, but.
those cases are so varied that they give rise to situations which require further subdivision and classification. They are therefore reserved for separate subsequent consideration. In the meantime an attempt will be made to
illustrate the operation of the rules by other cases.
4. ParticularSituations
(a) Sale and Agreement to Sell
In Cammell v. Sewell, 8 already cited, goods were shipped on a Prussian
ship at a Russian port for delivery to an English firm. The ship was wrecked
on the coast of Norway, and the cargo was discharged and sold by the master in Norway. It was held that the buyer got a good title by the law of
Norway and therefore a title entitled to recognition in England. It appeared that even by the law of Norway the master could not, as between
himself and the owners of the ship or the owners of the cargo, justify the
sale, and that he remained liable to them, but as the only question in the
case was the validity of the buyer's title, the contractual aspects were not
further discussed, and it was not necessary to decide whether the proper
law of the contract or any of the contracts with regard to the ship or the
cargo was Russian, Prussian or English.
In the Ontario case of McKenna v. Prieurand Hope,9 already cited,
a motor car was sold by one McDermott, a dealer in second-hand cars carrying on business at Montreal in the Province of Quebec, to the defendant
Hope, a dealer carrying on business at Alexandria in the province of Ontario. It transpired subsequently that the car had been stolen from the plaintiff in Rhode Island, and action was brought by him in Ontario against
Hope and one Prieur to whom Hope had resold the car. Owing to the fact
that, in accordance with the agreement of the parties, delivery of the car
was made by McDermott in Ontario and payment made there by Hope, it
is probable that under the English rule the proper law of the contract was
Ontario law, but the bargain was made in Quebec, and under the Restatement rule the proper law of the contract would be Quebec law. Inasmuch,
however, as the plaintiff was clearly entitled to assert his title to the car under
either Rhode Island or Ontario law, the only real question was whether the
effect of the Quebec transaction was to negative or qualify his right to assert
his title, and from this property point of view the governing law would be the
lez situs and not the proper law of the contract. While only one member
of the court (Smith, J. A.) mentioned the applicability of the lex situs as
65 H. & N. 728 (Eng. i86o). Cf. WESTLAiE, PRivATE INTERNATIOAL LAW (7th ed.
I925) § I5I; FoTE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1925) 446 ff.
956 Ont. L. R. 389 (1924), [1925] 2 D. L. R. 460.
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such, several of the judges expressed their views as to the effect of the
Quebec law (in the light of the evidence of a Quebec advocate), assuming
in favor of the defendants that that was the governing law. Two judges
considered that under either Quebec or Ontario law the contract was intended
to be executory, the title not to pass until delivery of the car in Alexandria,
and consequently that Hope acquired no property right by the transaction
in Quebec. The other judges discussed the effect of Article 1489 of the Civil
Code of Lower Canada,' 0 which states an exception to Article 1487.1' It
being assumed that McDermott was a trader within the meaning of Article
1489, the question remained whether Hope acquired any property right which
he was entitled to assert against the plaintiff in Ontario. One judge held that
there was no "sale" to Hope in Quebec, but merely an executory contract outside of the terms of Article 1489. The chief justice held that Hope acquired
no property right, but merely a possessory lien, which would have enabled him
to hold the car against the plaintiff until reimbursement by the plaintiff of
the amount paid by Hope to McDermott, if Hope had not lost his lien by
giving possession of the car to his sub-buyer Prieur. The remaining judge
(Smith, J. A.) agreed with the chief justice that Article 1489 did not operate
to transfer any title to Hope, but, differing from him, held that the operaton of the article was not to confer a possessory lien on Hope, but to restrain the owner from claiming his chattel till he reimbursed Hope, a
restraint which was independent of possession, but unavailing against the
plaintiff in Ontario.12 In other words this restraint was not a property
right, and was outside the rule that the lex siturs governs the creation of real
rights in a chattel.
If in the foregoing case we supposed that by the law of Quebec (the
le%situs) the buyer got a valid title, and that by the law of Ontario (the
proper law of the contract) the buyer did not get a good title, the buyer's
title would be entitled to recognition in Ontario. As it was, once it was
established that by the lex situs the buyer acquired no real right in the chattel, there was no difference between the laws of Ontario and Quebec as to
the recognition of the title of the owner from whom the car was stolen.
0"i1489. If a thing lost or stolen be bought in good faith in a fair or market, or at a
public sale, or from a trader dealing in similar articles, the owner cannot reclaim it, without
reimbursing to the purchaser the price he has paid for it."
""1487. The sale of a thing which does not belong to the seller is null, subject to
the exceptions declared in the three next following articles. The buyer may recover damages
of the seller, if he were ignorant that the thing did not belong to the latter." In addition
to art. 1489, already quoted, the exceptions are: "1488. The sale is valid if it be a commercial matter, or if the seller afterwards become owner of the thing"; and "1490. If the thing
lost or stolen be sold under the authority of law, it cannot be reclaimed." Art. 1488, which at
first reading might seem to be important, has been held in Quebec to be limited in its effect
to the parties to the sale and not to affect third parties. Tremblay v. Mercier & Lachaine,
Q. R. 38 Super. Ct. 57 (Que. i9og). In any event art 1488 has no bearing on thd case of a
lost or stolen thing (specially provided for in art. 1489) and it was not relied on in McKenna
v. Prieur & Hope.
2Approved in Phoenix Assurance Company v. Laniel, 59 Ont. L. R. 55 (1926), [x926]

3 D. L. R. 3oi.
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(b) Stoppage in Transitu and Dissolution
An interesting question is whether an unpaid seller'S right of stoppage
in transitu, or his right of dissolution for non-payment of the price, as the
case may be, is a contractual right (Jus ad ren) or a property right (Jus -in
re). Each of these rights appears in some of the cases to have been regarded as depending on the proper law of the contract of sale rather than
the lex situs, and therefore as being contractual rather than proprietary.
As contrasted with the right of stoppage of goods in transitu given to
an unpaid seller by English law in the event of the insolvency of the buyer,
and recognized by the Sale of Goods Act, in force in all the common law
provinces of Canada, but not part of the law of sale of goods of the province
of Quebec, the Civil Code of Lower Canada contains the following:
1538. The judgment of dissolution by reason of non-payment of
the price is pronounced at once, without any delay being granted by it
for the payment of the price; nevertheless the buyer may pay the price
with interest and costs of suit at any time before the rendering of the
judgment.
1543. In the sale of movable things the right of dissolution by
reason of non-payment of ihe price can only be exercised while the
thing sold remains in the possession of the buyer; without prejudice
to the seller's right of revendication as provided in the title Of Privileges and Hypothecs. [Added by 48 Vict. c. 2o, § I (1885), as
amended by 54 Vict. c. 39, § I (1891) : In cases of insolvency, such
right can only be exercised during the thirty days next after the delivery].
A comparison of the English and French versions of the articles just
quoted shows that the word "dissolution" is a translation of the French word
"resolution", the use of which would seem to indicate that a sale of goods is
regarded as a sale defeasible at the seller's instance upon fulfilment of a resolutive condition or condition subsequent (namely, upon non-payment of the
price), subject to the right of the buyer to pay the price, interest and costs
prior to judgment of dissolution. 1 3 The word "resiliation" also occurs,
instead of "dissolution", in some of the reported cases.
The next following cases are examples of situations arising out of a
change of situs from a country by the local law of which an unpaid seller
has a certain one of these rights to a country by the local law of which he
has not that right, but as the contest in each case was between the law of the
It might therefore be argued that the right of dissolution is a proprietary right, but in
Quebec there has been some difference of opinion on this point. See e. g., Hart v. Goldfine,
In re Rosenzweig, Q. R. 31 K. B. 558, 7o D. L. R. 174, 2 Can. Bkptcy. Rep. 255 (192i). While
the common law rules as to stoppage in transit do not prevail in Quebec, the seller might
bring an action for dissolution of the contract and revendication of the goods, and might
obtain a conservatory attachment of the goods; or, if he alone were named in the shipping
contract, or if he were able to deliver' up the bill of lading (or both or all the counterparts,
if more than one), he might give directions to the carrier. Acme Glove Works v. Canada
Steamship Lines, Q. R. 38 K. B. 487, [1925] 4 D. L. R. 494 (925).
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new situs and the law of the old situs, which was also the proper law of the
contract, the cases may not be decisive of the question whether the right
should be classed as contractual or proprietary.
Thus, in the Quebec case of Rogers v. Mississippiand Dominion Steamship Co.,' 4 a Quebec firm ordered goods from the plaintiffs, an English firm,
who shipped them by the defendant company's steamship from Liverpool
to Quebec, consigning them to the buyers and forwarding the bill of lading
to them. Before the goods were delivered by the defendant to the buyers,
the latter became insolvent and the plaintiffs, by notice to the defendant,
stopped the goods in transit. The curators of the buyers' insolvent estate
claimed the goods by virtue of Article 6 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada
which provides, inter alia, that "the law of Lower Canada is applied wherever the question involved relates to the distinction or nature of the property, to privileges and rights of lien [privileges et droits de gage, in the
French version], contestations as to possession;" and contended that any
right of dissolution which the plaintiffs might have had under the law of
Quebec was taken away by the concluding words of Article 1543, added by
48 Vict. c. 20, s. I : "In cases of insolvency, such right can only be exercised
luring the fifteen days next after the delivery." It was held, however, that
"delivery" meant delivery by the carriers to the buyers (and this delivery had
not taken place), and that in any case the right of stoppage in transitu was
not a lien (droit de gage) within the meaning of Article 6, so as to be governed by Quebec law, but was a right governed by the law of Englandapparently because it was the proper law of the contract-and that the
plaintiffs were entitled to succeed.
Again, in Rhode Island Locomotive Works v. South Eastern Railway
1
5
Co., a sale and delivery of two locomotives had been made in Rhode
Island and the seller took out an attachment in revendication in Quebec,
where the locomotives then were, claiming resiliation of the sale for nonpayment of the price. It was held that under Article 8 of the Civil Code of
Lower Canada the contract was governed by the law of the place where it
was made, Rhode Island, in the absence of circumstances showing that any
other law was intended to apply, and since the law of Rhode Island did not
give the seller any right of resiliation or any such remedy as that of attachment in revendication, the proceedings were dismissed. It was also held
that Article 6 did not apply so as to create, on movables brought into the
province, a privilege or recourse which did not attach to them before their
removal.
14 Quebec L. R. 99 (Super. Ct. 1888).
Lower Can. Jurist 86 (1886): followed in, Re Hollinger, Ex parte Appenzeller
Wettstein & Co., 8 Can. Bkptcy. Rep. 174 (1927), a case in which a seller under a contract
of sale made in Switzerland, having no right of resiliation by the law of Switzerland, was
held in Quebec to have no right of resiliation against the buyer, domiciled in Quebec, to
whom the goods had been delivered,
4

2a.31
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Again, in the Ontario case of Re Hudson Fashion Shoppe 6 Quebec
sellers were held entitled to exercise against an Ontario buyer a right of
resiliation conferred by the law of Quebec and unknown to Ontario law. An
order was taken in Ontario for certain goods, deliverable f. o. b. Montreal,
the order being subject to the approval of the sellers at Montreal, a card
being subsequently sent by the sellers to the buyer acknowledging receipt of
the order and saying, "Same will have our prompt attention." It was held
that whether the card was or was not a notification of the necessary approval
by the sellers at Montreal so as to amount to an acceptance there, the delivery of the goods f. o. b. Montreal completed the contract, and that the contract was a Quebec contract. It followed that on the buyer's failure to pay
and bankruptcy the sellers were entitled to rescind, although the goods had
been delivered to the buyer and therefore, if Ontario law had been the governing law, the unpaid sellers' last chance of preventing the goods from going
into the mass of the bankrupt's stock for the benefit of all the creditors
would have been lost upon the termination of the transit. If we were to
vary the facts of the case by supposing that the contract provided for delivery and payment in Ontario, the proper law of the contract would probably
be Ontario law, and, if the right of resiliation is a contractual and not a
proprietary right, the sellers would have had no remedy except to claim
as ordinary creditors of the bankrupt estate. The fact that the le% situs of
the goods at the time of the making of the contract was Quebec law would
have been of no assistance to them. On the other hand, if the right of resiliation is a proprietary right, so that the buyer gets, not the property in the
goods in an absolute sense, but only a modified kind of property-as the
court in Re Hudson Fashion Shoppe seemed to think-the governing law
would be the lex situs of the goods at the time of the contract of sale, without regard to the proper law of the contract-inconsistently with the court's
decision that the proper law of the contract determined whether the sellers
had a right of resiliation, but consistently with the actual result of the case,
because Quebec law was both the lex situs and the proper law of the contract.
It is perhaps of interest to note the fact that the Ontario legislature
subsequently passed a statute requiring a seller who has a right of revendication for nonpayment of the price under a contract of sale made outside
'a58 Ont. L. R. 130, [1926] I D. L. R. 199, 7 Can. Bkptcy. Rep. 68 (1925). In the recent case of Commercial Corporation Securities v. Nichols, [1933] I W. W. R. 484 (C. A.
Sask.), a conditional sale of a motor car was made in Saskatchewan and the car was deliv-

ered there. On default by the buyer, the car was seized and sold in Alberta, in accordance
with Saskatchewan law, but not in accordance with Alberta law. The seller then brought an
action in Saskatchewan against the buyer for the deficiency. It was held that the seller was
entitled to succeed, the proper law of the contract being Saskatchewan law. The situs of the
car at the time of the contract of conditional sale was also Saskatchewar, but there was no
suggestion in the judgments that the lex situa as such might be applicable. Any such suggestion would have opened up the question whether the right of action in Saskatchewan was
dependent on the validity of the resale in Alberta in accordance with the lex sitils at the time
of the resale, regardless of the question whether the contract of conditional sale was; governed by the law of Saskatchewan as the lexa situs or as the proper law of the contract.
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of Ontario to file the contract or a caution relating thereto in the same manner and within the same time after the goods are brought into Ontario as
a conditional sale agreement is required to be registered. 1 7 The result is
of course to overrule the case of Re Hudson Fashion.Shoppe in its particular application in the province of Ontario, without, however, affecting in
other respects the application of the general principle of conflict of laws
which the case has been used to illustrate. Piecemeal legislation of this kind,
avoiding the local application of a general rule of conflict of laws in a special kind of case, is hardly to be commended. The effect of the general rule
was of course to give a Quebec seller in certain circumstances a privilege
which would be unavailable to an Ontario seller in like circumstances, and
the true remedy might be to amend the local law of Ontario as to an unpaid
seller's rights and to adopt what even some common lawyers have considered the more just provisions of the civil law.',
(c) Substantial Validity
The validity of a conveyance of a chattel alleged to be void between
the parties for illegality of the transfer or illegality of the consideration or
other reasons, or alleged to be voidable between the parties for fraud or
other cause, is determined by the law of the state where the chattel is situated at the time of conveyance. 19 Similarly, the question whether a contract is void or voidable between the parties is determined by the proper
law of the contract.20 If a transaction contains both contractual and property elements, theoretically the proper law and the le: situs would respectively be applicable, but usually the property effect of the transaction would
be more important than its contractual effect, and in any event the proper law
of the contract would have to yield so as to allow full operation to the property effect in accordance with the lex situs.
1

7Ont. Statutes, 1929, c. 23, § 8, amending Ont. Statutes, 1927, c. 42, § s; Re Meredith,
ii Can. Bkptcy. Rep. 405 (193o); Re Modem Cloak Co., ii Can. Bkptcy. Rep. 442 (193o).
The case of Re Hudson: Fashio. Shoppe was not followed in the Nova Scotia case of Re
Satisfaction Stores, 6o Nova Scotia L. Rep. 357 (1929), [19291 2 D. L. R. 435, I1 Can. Bkptcy.
Rep. 141, because of a provision in the Nova Scotia Statutes requiring registration in the province of a conditional sale made outside the province of a chattel subsequently brought into the
province (the majority of the court--erroneously, it is submitted-being of the opinion
that the effect of the right of dissolution under the Civil Code of Lower Canada is to prevent the passing of the property in the chattel until payment of the price).
23Cf. Inglis v. Usherwood, i East 515, 524 (K. B. i8oi) (Lord Kenyon, C. 3., quoted in
Re Hudson Fashion Shoppe). In Inglis v. Usherwood itself, the unpaid seller's right to
retake possession of the goods was held to be governed by Russian law, but it is not clear
whether that law was applied because it was the lex situs of the goods when they were
shipped or because it was the proper law of the contract of sale. Cf. WESTI.AXE op. cit.
supranote 8, at § I5O (notes).
" Comment (a) on CONFLmcT OF LAWs RESTATEmENT § 277. Quare whether, for the
present purpose, any useful distinction can be drawn between a conveyance voidable for fraud
or other cause and a sale dissoluble under Quebec law by reason of the non-payment of the
price. See supra note 13.
Cf. CONFLIcr OF LAws RESTATEMENT § 376B; (I9O4) 64 L. R. A. 827.
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If a transaction is alleged to be void or voidable because entered into
in fraud of creditors, practically it is only the property effect which is of
importance; and even as to the contractual effect of the transaction it would
appear difficult to apply a proper law ascertained by considerations personal
to the parties to the transaction when the ground of alleged invalidity is the
protection of the interest of third parties. At least as to the property effect
of the transaction, the question is one of the validity in substance of the
conveyance of a chattel and is governed by the lex situs of the chattel at
the time of conveyance.

21

(d) Pledge and Lien
Westlake says :22 "Questions as to the transfer or acquisition of property in corporeal movables, or of any less extensive real rights in them, as
pledge or lien, are generally to be decided by the le: situs."
As regards pledge, the matter is comparatively simple from the point
of view of conflict of laws. A bailment of a chattel by way of security is
known to most systems of law, and, as delivery of possession is an essential
part of the transaction, not only must the pledge necessarily be made in the
country of the situs of the chattel, but the question of the recognition of its
validity in another country is free from the difficulty which sometimes arises
in the case of a chattel mortgage, 23 namely, that the law of the other country
may refuse to recognize the validity of a mortgage unaccompanied by delivery of possession. A pledge, at least in English law, gives the pledgee
some kind of proprietary right, sometimes called a special property, in the
chattel, and the case falls dearly within the general conveyancing rule and
is governed by the le: situs. 24 But it has been said that the question whether

a pledgee may redeliver the goods to the pledgor for a limited purpose without thereby losing his rights under the contract of pledge, those parties
having a common domicile in a country different from the situs of the goods,
is determined by the law of the domicile, as governing the transaction between them or as affecting title to goods admittedly belonging to one or
other of them.25
The case of a lien, mentioned in Westlake's Section 150, is not quite
so simple. If what is meant is some kind of charge upon a chattel not depending on possession, the case is within the general conveyancing rule and
= CoNFmIcr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT
§ 280; (I9O8) II L. R. A. ioo7.

§

277;

see also the illustrations following comment

(a) on

Op. cit. supranote 8, at § 15o.

= See case (A2), infra p. 833.

City Bank v. Barrow, 5 App. Cas. 664 (188o) ; Inglis v. Robertson, [1898] A. C. 616;

cf. CoNFLIcT OF LAws RESTATEmENT § 300.

op. cit. supra note 8
' North Western Bank v. Poynter, [1895] A. C. 56; WEsTLAx,
(notes). As was pointed out in Inglis v. Robertson, supra note 24, the goods in the Poynter
case were part of a ship's cargo and their situs, which was said to be different from the
country of domicile, was their situs only in the sense that it was the port of destination of
the ship.
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is governed by the lex situs, but if the lien is valid by that law without delivery of possession and if possession is not in fact given, the recognition
of the validity of the lien in another country might encounter the difficulty
already indicated in connection with a chattel mortgage. If what is meant
is a possessory lien, that is, a right to retain possession of another person's
chattel, not necessarily or usually involving any property right on the part
of the lienholder, such a right could hardly be asserted anywhere except in
the country of the situs and could not be successfully asserted in defiance
of the lex situs, but it is not clear that the lex situs, as such, should be the
governing law. In the case of the lien of the repairer or improver of a chattel, the proper law of the contract between the parties would usually if not
necessarily be the same as the lex situs of the chattel. 6 In the case of an
unpaid seller's lien under a contract of sale, however, the proper law of the
contract might be different from the lex situs of the chattel, and it may be
that the right to the lien ought to be regarded as a contractual right, governed by the proper law of the contract, not a property right, governed by
the leX situs.2 7 The Conflict of Laws Restatement, however, provides simply (Sec. :99) that the "validity of a lien on a chattel is determined by the
law of the state where the chattel is situated at the time when the lien is
created."
(e)

Some Continental Views

The broad distinction between the contractual and the property effects
of a transaction is stated dearly by Niboyet, 8 the intrinsic validity and
effect of the transaction being governed by the law appropriate to obligations as regards any jus ad rem, and by the lex situs as regards any jus in re.
The distinction is well stated, and its consequences are discussed with
an admirable combination of conciseness and detail by Gutzwiller 2
As
he says, the lex situs governs all questions of real rights (alle sachenrechtlichen Fragen), but it governs, only questions of real rights, and it does not
govern the contractual effects (die obligationenrechtlichenWirkungen)
which result from the transaction either in the place of real effects or in
addition to its real effects.
A difficulty may arise, however, as between two countries which have
widely different systems of local law. When we pass beyond the case of
the property simpliciter in a chattel, something which is recognized gener"A good example of the application of the lex situs to a repairer's lien is WillysOverland Co. v. Evans, io4 Kan. 632, i8o Pac. 235 (1919), cited by Beale, Progress of the
Law, 1958-19 (1919) 33 H.ARv. L. Rv. I, at 15, 16.

Cf.(i9o4) 64 L. R. A. 83i-832.
Op. cit. supra note 7, § 507, at 635.
NMTEnNATIO'APPIVATRECHT (in

TEIATISCm DARSTE-UNG)

STA.iMLE,

DAS GESAMTE DEUTSCHn IECHT IN SYS-

(Berlin, 1931) 1593 ff.
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ally in different systems of law, we may find it difficult to apply to particular or special real rights in a chattel the rule that such rights are governed
by the lex situs and that if valid according to that law they are entitled to
be recognized elsewhere. In order that a real right in a chattel created under
the law of X may be effectually recognized in Y, it is necessary that there
be some category of the law of Y in which the real right created under the
law of X may be placed. Even though the category of the law of Y need
not be identical with that of the law of X, there must be some measure of
analogy between the two categories in order that the real right may be
recognized in Y without doing undue violence to the legal system of Y.
If the divergence between the legal systems of X and Y is so great as to
preclude the recognition in Y of the right created in X, we have an example of a rule of public policy (ordre public) of Y which interferes with the
30
application of the general rule.
V. CONDITIONAL SALES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES
I. General Principles
To a certain extent conditional sale agreements and chattel mortgages
may be discussed together because they produce similar situations for the
present purpose. If A, the owner of a chattel, makes with B a conditional
sale agreement whereby the title to the chattel is reserved to A until payment in full by B, but under which possession is given to B; or if B, the
owner of a chattel, conveys it to A by way of mortgage, B retaining possession; in either case, A is the true owner of the chattel, or at least has
some property in the chattel, and B is the possessor and the ostensible
owner. 31 In either case, both in Canada and the United States, the prevailing
tendency of legislation is to require some filing or recording of a document
evidencing the title of A, who is not in possession, in order that that title
shall not only be good against B, but also be unimpeachable at the suit of
innocent third parties who deal with B on the faith of his ostensible title.
If the chattel is situated in X, and the conditional sale agreement or
the chattel mortgage is made there, and the chattel is subsequently removed
IoLewald, supra note 5, at 373, § 281, and in DAS DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE PRIVATREcHT, 184, § 246; cf. Nmoyar, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 512, 513, at 639. The point has already been mentioned in § iv, 2, supra; as to chattel mortgages, see also case (A2), infra p.
833.
" It has been suggested that a conditional sale is in effect a completed sale with a mortgage back to secure the payment of the purchase price. WH.LsToN, SALES OF GOODS (2nd
ed. 1924) §§ 304, 330, 337. But the two transactions are not always treated in the same
manner. Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 779, n. i. From the point of view of English law,
or Anglo-American law generally, the two transactions produce essentially equivalent situations as regard the conflict of interest between A and a subsequent buyer, pledgee or mortgagee from B, but for the purposes of conflict of laws it is important to note that some systems
of law will more readily recognize the validity of a reservation of title without retention of
possession than the validity of a chattel mortgage without delivery of ,possession. See
case (A2), infra p. 833. See also (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 628.
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to Y at least two questions of conflict of laws arise,32 namely, (i) whether
A's title will be recognized in Y, in the absence of a subsequent dealing there
with the chattel between B and a third party, C; and (2) whether, if the
chattel is, in Y, sold, pledged or mortgaged by B to C, who takes without
notice of A's title, A's title will be there recognized as against C.
In order to present for consideration as many situations as possible
arising from the similarity or variance, as the case may be, of the laws of
X and Y respectively, and to classify as far as possible the problems resulting from the removal of a chattel from X to Y3, it is proposed to state (A)
the case of A's title being good by the law of X, not only as against B, but
also as against third parties, (B) the case of A's title being by the law of X
good as against B, but impeachable by third parties, and (C) the case of
A's title being either void ab initio by the law of X or actually avoided under
that law; and in connection with each of these cases to consider various alternative hypothetical provisions of the law of Y.
No attempt will be made here to make a new review or classification
of the multitude of reported cases in the United States or even of the comparatively small number of Canadian cases. All that will be attempted is to
state various situations and to suggest the principles of law which ought to
be applied to the conflict of interests arising from each situation, without
any implication that every suggested solution could be supported by the citation of a reported case or is in accordance with the current of authority.
2.

ParticularSituations

(A) Reservation of Title or Chattel Mortgage Valid by Original Lex Situs
We suppose, in the first place, either that A, the owner of a chattel situated in X, makes there a conditional sale agreement with B, reserving the
title to A until payment in full, and giving possession to B there, or that B,
the owner of a chattel situate in X, conveys it there to A by way of mortgage, B retaining possession; and we suppose that by the law of X, A's
title, reserved in the one case and conveyed in the other, is valid not only
as against B, but also as against third parties, either because no filing is required by the law of X or because the filing requirements of the law of X
have been complied with.
If we further suppose that the chattel is removed by B to Y, and that
B there purports to sell, pledge or mortgage it to C, who takes for value, in
" See, generally, WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 31, § 339, at 799 ff. (conditional sales) ;
GooDmICnr, CoNmicr OF LAws (1927) 353 if. (conditional sales and chattel mortgages);
Marley, Conflict of Laws as to Sale of Live iStock in one State held under Chattel Mortgage
in Another (1902) 54 CENT. L. J. 443; Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 779; Comment (1928)
37 YALE L. J. 966; see Notes (1904) 64 L. R. A. 833; (1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) 385; L. PA. i9iTD 942; (1923) 25 A. L. R. 153; (1904) 64 L. R. A. 353; (1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. s.)
385; (1928) 57 A. L. R. 702. As to a change of situs of the chattel without the consent of
the owner, see Part One, published last month, at 675 ff. and infra p. 839 et seq.
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good faith and without notice of A's title or B's want of title, the nature of
the problems that may arise may be made clearer by a statement of possible
alternative provisions of the law of Y.
On the principles already discussed,8 3 applicable to the conveyance of
a chattel, and apart from any statute of the situs of the chattel which furnishes a rule of conflict of laws, as distinguished from a rule of local law,
it would seem (i) that the nature and validity of A's title under the conditional sale agreement or chattel mortgage must be governed solely by the
local law of X, even after the removal of the chattel to Y, and (2) that
the validity and effect of a conveyance, pledge or mortgage by B to C must
be governed solely by the local law of Y.
By way of parenthesis it should be noted that it is impossible to state
the cases in which creditors are protected within the classification of cases
in which subsequent purchasers, pledgees or mortgagees are protected. Creditors of B (even attaching creditors, that is, creditors who by legal process
obtain a lien or charge on B's chattels) are not in the position of purchasers for value without notice from him, and as a rule stand in no better
position than B " with regard to a chattel in B's possession, but owned by
A, unless the law of the situs confers on them some real right in the chattel,
valid against A. 8 5 In other words, creditors are not entitled to claim a
chattel by virtue of a rule of the lex situs relating to dispositions by a person who is in possession of a chattel without title, but by virtue of a special
rule, usually statutory, of the lex situs relating to the protection of creditors.
We must now consider various alternative provisions of the law of Y.
(A i). The law of Y may by statute require, as to a conditional sale
agreement made in X, or a chattel mortgage made in X, that, in order that the
transaction shall be valid in Y as against third parties, a document evidencing the transaction be filed in Y within a specified period after the conditional seller or the mortgagee has notice of the removal of the chattel to Y;"6
or the law of Y may even require registration within a specified period after
the removal of the chattel to Y, regardless of the knowledge of the conditional seller or mortgagee.
In this case, which for convenience of reference we may call Case (A i),
that is, if there is a statute in force in Y of the kind just indicated, the statute furnishes a rule of conflict of laws applicable to the situation in question,
as distinguished from the local law of Y relating to conditional sale agreeSee supra p. 831.
" Cf. Cleveland Machine Works v. Lang, 67 N. H. .48, 31 Atl. 20 (1892).
Cf. CO NFLIcr oF LAws RESTATEIMENT §§ 29o and 297, quoted infra p. 846.
*'As to conditional sale agreements, the supposed law of Y is the law in any state
which has adopted the American Uniform Conditional Sales Act, or in any province which
has adopted the Canadian Uniform Conditional Sales Act.

CONTRACT AND CONVEYANCE IN CONFLICT OF LAWS

ments and chattel mortgages, or the local law of Y relating to dispositions
by persons in possession of chattels but without title to them, and cadit
quaestio. The general principles which would otherwise have applied to the
situation must yield to the statute, the courts of Y being of course bound
by the statute of Y.3 T
Rightly or wrongly, the statute of Y settles the matter so far as a
court of Y is concerned, and if the chattel is still situated in Y when any
question of property rights in the chattel arises in a court of X or in a court
of Z, practical necessity compels the acceptance in X or Z of the result which
has been or would be reached in the court of Y.38 If, however, the chattel
is no longer situated in Y, it does not follow that the statutory rule of conflict of laws of Y should be applied in X or Z. On the contrary, on principle, the court of X or Z should apply its own rule of conflict of laws, which
would normally involve the application of the local law of Y, and the nonapplication of the rules of conflict of laws of Y, as to dealings in Y with
the chattel while it was situate in Y. In the United States and Canada, as
between states (or provinces) in which a uniform conditional statute is enacted containing a provision for filing of a conditional sale agreement in the
state (or province) to which a chattel is removed, the tendency may be to
adopt the provision as a rule of conflict of39laws even in the state (or province) from which the chattel is removed.
(A 2). The law of Y may refuse to recognize the validity of a reservation of title under a conditional sale agreement without retention of possession, or the validity of a chattel mortgage without delivery of possession.
In this case, which we may call Case (A 2), that is, if there is a rule
of local public policy of Y which prevents the recognition of A's title, even
though acquired or retained in X, this rule prevents the normal application
of principles of conflict of laws relating to the acquisition or retention of
title. But whereas in Case (A i) the statute which furnishes a rule of conflict of laws is binding in Y regardless of principle, the propriety of the rule
of local public policy in Case (A 2) is open to discussion, and if found to be
in contravention of principle should be rejected by any court which is not
bound by previous decisions. The mere fact that the local law of Y does
not, as to transactions in Y, recognize the validity of a chattel mortgage or
a reservation of title unaccompanied by possession is of course not a sufficient reason why the validity of a title acquired or retained in X should not
' For examples of the application of a statutory provision of this kind, see WILISTON,
(1928) 57
op. cit. supra note 31, at 8o2; (1923) 25 A. L. R. 157 ff. (conditional sales);
provision, the

A. L. R. 722 ff. (chattel mortgages). In the absence of an express statutory
majority rule in the United States is that filing is not required in the state to which the
chattel is removed: cf. (1928) 57 A. L. R. 711 ff.
' See Part One, published last month, at 68I if.
23It is not intended to be suggested by this statement of a possible tendency that comity
or reciprocity is a justifiable basis for the application of a foreign law.
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be recognized in Y. If the law of Y regards the local rule as a rule of public policy, a court of Y is bound by the rule, but a court of X or Z may disregard it, unless the fact of the actual situation of the chattel in Y compels
the court of X or Z to accept the reshlt of a decision of a court of Y.
Examples of a rule of public policy of the kind stated in Case A(2)
may be found in the laws of France, Germany, and, possibly, Quebec and
some of the states of the United States.40
(A 3). The local law of Y may require filing of a conditional sale
agreement if possession is given to the buyer, or of a chattel mortgage if
in order that the transaction may
possession is retained by the mortgagor,
41
be valid as against third parties.
In this case, which we may call Case (A 3), the statutory provisions of
the kind just stated are strictly part of the local law of Y; and (it being
assumed that the statute does not by its terms apply to a conditional sale
agreement or a chattel mortgage made in X, so as to bring the case within
Case (A i), such provisions have no bearing on the question of conflict of
laws now under discussion. Prima facie such provisions relate only to conditional sale agreements or chattel mortgages made in Y, and this limitation
of the operation of the statute is usually a necessary consequence of the requirements as to filing in the particular district in which the chattel is conditionally sold or mortgaged.
The case is a common one, and generally speaking the result is clear,
namely, that A's title, validly acquired or retained under the law of X,
is recognized in Y, and there being no provision of the law of Y that prevents his asserting that title in Y, a subsequent sale, pledge or mortgage by
B to C is invalid.4"
40As to France,

see PIrxr, TRArIr PRATIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvL (Paris
736-737; NiBoYET, op. cit. supra note 7, § 513, pp. 639-64o (gage). As to Germany
see Lewald, supra note 5, at 373, § 281, and in DAs DEU Susc INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT
§ 246, pp. 184-185.
1923)

In Quebec, as in the other provinces of Canada, the validity of a pledge depends on
CODE OF LowER CANADA, art. 1970), but
the law of Quebec, differing from that of the other provinces, provides (id. art. 2o22) that
"moveables are not susceptible of hypothecation, except as provided in the titles Of Merchant
Shipping and Of Bottomry and Respondentia." A gage or chattel mortgage unaccompanied
by possession is invalid (Payenneville v. Prdvost, Q. R. 25 K. B. 246 (Que. 1916)) ; Desjardins v. Methot, 17 Quebec P. R. 454 (i9i6)), and it would appear probable that this rule
of Quebec law is so strongly held that a Quebec court would refuse to recognize the validity
of such a mortgage made elsewhere upon a chattel subsequently removed to Quebec. On
the other hand, Quebec law recognizes the validity of a reservation of title without retention
of possession. Bernier v. Durand, Q. R. 25 K. B. 461, 32 D. L. R. 768 (i916).
As to Pennsylvania and, formerly, Louisiana, see the special note to § 287 of the CoNFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEmENT. See also Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (IgI),
and annotation in (923) 25 A. L. R. ir49, at 1157. The general rule in the United States
appears to be that a title validly reserved in X will be recognized in Y notwithstanding that
the local law of Y as to conditional sales is different from that of X. Cf. GooDRicr. oP. cit.
supra note 32, at .3.4: WILISTON, op. cit. supra note .I, at 8oo.
a If Y is a province of Canada or a state of the United States, its law would usually so
provide.
I See, e. g., GooDRicH, op. cit. supra note 32, at 354, 357; (1928) 57 A. L. R. 711 ff.

possession of the creditor or a third party (CiviL
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A good example is the Canadian case of Bonin v. Robertson.4" A resident of Minnesota, owner of a span of horses situated there, mortgaged
them to a bank there in the form and under the conditions required by the
law of Minnesota to constitute a valid mortgage as against subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor. The mortgagor (whether with or without
the mortgagee's consent does not appear) took the horses to South Edmonton, then in the North West Territories of Canada, and sold them to the
plaintiff, a purchaser for value, in good faith and without notice. The
horses having been afterwards seized by the defendant, a bailiff acting for
the mortgagee, the plaintiff brought action in the Territorial Court. The
action was dismissed, notwithstanding that the mortgage had not been filed
in the registration district at Edmonton, as would have been required in the
case of a chattel mortgage made there upon chattels situated there, but as
was not provided for in the case of a mortgage made elsewhere on a chattel
situated elsewhere. Admittedly the mortgagee had a good title to the horses
when they were taken to the North West Territories and neither at common
law nor by virtue of any ordinance of the Territories, could the mortgagor,
a person in possession with the owner's consent, but without title or with
merely a limited title or right to redeem, give a good title even to an innocent purchaser.
(A 4). The local law of Y may recognize the validity of the reservation of title by a conditional seller without either retention of possession
or filing, or the validity of the conveyance to a mortgagee without either
giving of possession or filing.
As we have seen, the statutory provisions of the law of Y stated in
Case (A 3) have no bearing on the question of conflict of laws under
discussion, and a fortiori the condition of the law of Y stated in the present
case, which we may call Case (A 4), has no bearing on that question, though
that condition of the law may make the courts of Y more inclined than they
would otherwise be to uphold A's title.
For example, while a mortgage of a chattel without delivery of possession is unknown to the law of Quebec, that law allows a valid reserva44
tion of title to be made without retention of possession and without filing,
and therefore would have no difficulty in recognizing a reservation of title
validly made under a foreign law. Thus, where the tftle was validly reserved in Ontario, and the buyer took the chattel to Quebec and there sold
it to an innocent third party, the original seller was held entitled 45to revendicate the chattel in Quebec without reimbursing the second buyer.
23:Terr. L. R. 21 (1893), followed in a Saskatchewan conditional sale case, Sawyer V.
Boyce, i Sask. L. R. 23o. 8 Western L. R. 8.34 (i9o8).
"See references under case (A 2) in the present section, supra note 40.
Williams v. Nadon, Q. R. 32 Sup. Ct. 250 (Que. i9o7) : a conditional sale of a piano
bearing the name of the seller-manufacturer, and therefore not requiring filing under the
Ontario statute.
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(A 5). The local law of Y may recognize the validity of a sale, pledge
or mortgage by a person who is in possession of a chattel without title to it,
in the particular circumstances.
The branch of the law of Y just stated, in what we may call Case
(A 5), is of course the branch of the law of Y with which we are chiefly concerned, and it is normally the only branch of the law of Y which has any
bearing on the question of conflict of laws under discussion. In other words,
unless the law of Y contains, as in Case (A i), provisions for the filing in
Y of a conditional sale agreement or mortgage made in X, or, as in Case
(A 2), a rule of local public policy which prevents the recognition of A's
title, retained or acquired under the law of X, we are concerned only with
the law of X, and not at all with the law of Y, relating to conditional sale
agreements or chattel mortgages, up to the moment when B purports to sell,
pledge or mortgage the chattel in Y, and then we are concerned only with
the law of Y, and not at all with the law of X, relating to dispositions by a
person in possession by the consent of the owner but without title.
When it is said that the validity of the transaction in Y depends solely
on the law of Y, this means the law of Y as applied to the disposition made
in Y by a person who has obtained possession by virtue of the transaction
in X. In other words, the facts of the transaction in X may be an essential part of the case which has to be decided by the law of Y, because it may
be material, in order to decide whether the disposition by B to C is valid
by the law of Y, to know in what circumstances B has obtained possession.
The circumstances in which the law of Y will recognize the validity
of a disposition by a possessor who is not the owner will of course differ
according as Y happens to be a country, such as England, where a thief can
give a good title by sale in market overt, 46 and a person who has sold goods
and who remains in possession, or a person who has bought or agreed to
buy goods and who obtains possession with the consent of the seller, can
give a good title by sale, pledge or other disposition to an innocent third
party, 47 or happens to be some other country the law of which is less generous to the innocent third party,48 or happens to be some other country
which is more generous to the innocent third party or, in other words, pro49
tects purchase rather than title.
It follows that in essentially the same situation the result of the sale,
pledge or mortgage made to C in Y by B, who admittedly has no title by
56 & 57 Vicr. c. 71, § 22, subject to the revesting of the
(§ 24).
conviction
to
prosecuted
is
thief
title Tif the
' FAcTots Act1 1889, 52 & 53 VIct. c. 45, §§ 8, 9; SALE OF GOODS Act, supra note 46,
§ 25. The statement in the text is of course not intended to be a complete statement of the
cases in which by English law a person in possession of a chattel with the owner's consent
can give a good title to a third party without the owner's consent.
"The law of Ontario, like that of most if not all of the other provinces of Canada, is
slightly less generous. because the law of market overt is inap~plicable.
"See Part One, published last month, especially notes 66-69.

"Cf.

SALE OF Goons ACT, 1893,
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the law which governs the property effect of the transaction between A and
B (the law of X), will vary according to the degree of protection given
to innocent third parties by the law which governs the property effects of
the transaction between B and C (the law of Y). The difference of result
is, of course, inevitable so long as different countries have different local
systems of laws; and it is not remediable by any system of conflict of laws,
and does not affect the generality of the application of the rules of conflict
of laws already stated. There is, for example, no inconsistency from the
point of view of conflict of laws in saying that in Case (A 3) the effect of
the local law of Y as to filing conditional sales agreements or chattel mortgages has usually no bearing on the validity of A's title retained under a
conditional sale agreement or acquired under a chattel mortgage made in
X, even if the chattel is removed to Y!, and in saying that in Case (A 5) the
local law of Y as to the validity of dispositions made by persons in possession without title is usually decisive of the validity of A's title as against
C, who takes under a sale, pledge or mortgage made by B in Y. As Williston says, 0° the circumstances of the case which may estop A from asserting his title as against C exist in Y, and the question whether they are sufficient to estop A must be decided by the law of y.51
(B) Reservation of Title or ChattelMortgage Voidable by Original
Lex Situs
(C) Reservation of Title or Chattel Mortgage Void by the Original
Lex Situs 52

As under heading (A), we again suppose either that A, the owner of
a chattel situated in X, makes there a conditional sale agreement with B,
reserving the title to A until payment in full, and giving possession to B
there, or that B, the owner of a chattel situate in X, conveys it there to A
by way of mortgage, B retaining possession; but, differing from the cases
considered under heading (A), we now suppose that by the law of X, either
(B) A's title is valid as against B but, by reason of the failure to file the
agreement or mortgage or otherwise, is impeachable by third parties in certain circumstances; or (C) A's title is strictly void, that is, as against anyone A has ineffectually attempted to reserve a title or to obtain a title by
way of mortgage.
co Op. cit. supra note 31, at 8O.

a The learned author seems to state the cases which have been decided in favor of the
innocent purchaser as inconsistent with those which have been decided in favor of the
conditional seller, but it is not clear whether the difference of result is due to the application
of different rules of conflict of laws or merely to the application of different local rules of law.
t For reasons which will be apparent from the discussion which follows, headings (B)
and (C) are here placed together without any intervening comment and are not followed, as
heading (A) is, by a statement of alternative provisions of the law of the new situs. See
(925) 25 A. L. R. 1168 ff. for a collection of cases in which by the law of the original situs
the conditional seller did not effectively reserve the title as against third parties; cf. GooDicH, op. cit. supranote 32, at 355, n. 83.
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We further suppose, as under heading (A), that the chattel is removed
by B to Y and that B there purports to sell, pledge or mortgage it to C, who
takes for value, in good faith and without notice of A's title or B's want of
title.
Subject to certain limitations to be mentioned presently, the cases coming under heading (B) would appear to resemble the cases coming under
heading (A) rather than those coming under heading (C). That is to say,
if under a conditional sale by A to B or a chattel mortgage from B to A, A
has a title good inter partes and existing, though voidable, as against third
parties, it would seem to follow that A's title should be recognized in Y,
and that the consideration of the validity of any subsequent transaction between B and C in Y should begin with the lack of title of B. Broadly speaking therefore the conclusions reached in cases (A i), (A 2), etc., should be
applicable to the parallel cases (B i), (B 2), etc.

The generality of the foregoing statement must, however, be somewhat
modified when we consider exactly what is meant by A's title being voidable
by the law of X. If the law of X makes A's title impeachable only by subsequent purchasers, etc., in X, and his title has not in fact been impeached
in X, then it is right to say that the result of the subsequent transaction in
Y between B and C will be governed by the law of Y as applied to a case
which has as its starting point the validity of A's title by the law of X. If,
on the other hand, the law of X makes A's title impeachable by subsequent
purchasers, etc., anywhere, whether in X or elsewhere, then it may happen
that the subsequent transaction in Y is within the protection of the law of
X, that is, that even by the law of X the subsequenr transaction gives 'a
good title to C as against A. In this event, if the question of the title arises
in Y, the case would be free from the difficulty of B's lack of title, and the
effect of the transaction between B and C would be governed by the ordinary
local law of Y, as applied to a case which has as its starting point the validity
of B's title. The case would in fact be essentially similar to the cases coming under heading (C), that is, cases in which A's title is void by the law of X.
Again, if a chattel is delivered by A to B in X under a conditional
agreement for the purpose of resale in the ordinary course of B's business,
and the law of X recognizes B's power to give a good title to C, who deals
with B in the ordinary course of B's business, notwithstanding the reservation of title as between A and B, and whether the agreement is filed or not,
the case is only nominally one in which A has a voidable title by the law of
X. In effect, so far as resale in the ordinary course of B's business is concerned, B has an effective title, or at.least an effective power to transfer the
title, and, except in the unlikely contingency that the law of X limits its
protection to persons who buy from B in X, the case would in substance resemble the cases coming under heading (C), and not those coming under
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heading (B). In the event of a subsequent transaction between B and C
in Y no difficulty arises by reason of B's lack of title.
Again, if A's title, originally voidable by the law of X, has been declared void prior to the transaction between B and C in Y, the case would
come tinder heading (C) rather than heading (B). Clearly so, as regards
-A'stitle; but if A's title has been declared void at the instance of B's creditors or a buyer, pledgee or mortgagee from B, there would probably be little
interest in the chattel left which might be the subject of any subsequent transaction in Y between B and C.
In addition to the cases just mentioned of a title originally voidable
by the law of X, but in effect void as regards a subsequent transaction in Y,
we may imagine cases of title originally void by the law of X, that is, cases
strictly coming under heading (C).
If the law of X refuses to recognize, even inter partes, the validity of a
reservation of title under a conditional sale agreement without retention of
possession, or the validity of a chattel mortgage without delivery of possession, we have the converse of Case (A 2), already discussed, in which we supposed the law of Y to be as just stated, as applied to a case of a chattel
removed to Y by B, and there made the subject of a transaction between
B and C notwithstanding that A had previously validly reserved or obtained
a title in X. If it is the law of X which refuses to recognize the validity of
A's title, the case is comparatively simple. B, having the title by the law
of X, may remove it to Y and there deal with it in accordance with the
local law of Y.
So, if the law of X makes absolutely void 53 a conditional sale agreement unless there is either retention of possession of the chattel by the seller
or filing of the agreement, or a chattel mortgage unless there is either delivery of possession of the chattel or filing of the mortgage, and the provisions
of the law are not complied with, we have another comparatively simple case,
in which B may remove the chattel to Y and there deal with it in accordance
with the local law of Y.
3. Conflict of Laws Restatement
The Conflict of Laws Restatement (Proposed Final Draft No. 2), relating to conditional sales and chattel mortgages, presents certain features
which seem to be difficult to reconcile with the classification of situations
above outlined and with some of the conclusions reached with regard to
them. This is so quite apart from the fact that the Restatement, having
already adopted the view that some modification of the general rule that the
lex situs governs the conveyance of a chattel should be admitted in cases in
0 Conditional sale and chattel mortgage statutes sometimes use the word "void", but
they are usually construed as making transactions merely voidable.
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which the chattel has been removed without the consent of its owner, 54 necessarily recognizes that similar modifications should be admitted in the conditional sale and chattel mortgage situations. But, as already pointed out,
whereas the compilers of the Restatement have considered that the general
conveyancing rule is sufficiently modified by a special limitation as to jurisdiction, they have in the case of conditional sale and chattel mortgages dealt
with a similar kind of question in the text of the property sections themselves. The matter of the consent or want of consent of the owner to the
removal of a chattel is indeed so interwoven with the other elements of the
Restatement solution of conditional sale and chattel mortgage problems that
they cannot be entirely separated in the present discussion.
In the following analysis of the Restatement provisions, the parallel
sections relating to chattel mortgages and conditional sales of chattels respectively are grouped together for the purpose of comparison. The provisions fall into four groups.
(i) Provisions which restate, as applied to the particular cases of mortgages and conditional sales, the general conveyancing rule that the governing law is the lexr situs of the chattel at the time of the transaction in question. 55
286. The validity and effect of a mortgage of a chattel is determined by the law of the state where the chattel is situated at the time
when the mortgage is executed.
292. Whether a sale of a chattel under which possession is delivered to the vendee and the title is to vest in the vendee at a subsequent
time upon the payment of a part or all of the price, or upon the performance of any other condition or the happening of any contingency, is
effective to retain title in the vendor depends upon the law of the state
where the chattel is situated at the time of the sale.
(2) Provisions as to the recognition in Y, to which the chattel has been
removed, of A's title validly acquired in X under a chattel mortgage from B
or retained in X under a conditional sale to B.
287. If a chattel is validly mortgaged in accordance with the law
of the state where it is situated at the time of the execution of the mortgage and is thereafter taken into another state, the mortgagee's interest
in the chattel is recognized in the second state.
293. If by the law of the state where a chattel is situated at the
time of a conditional sale the title remains in the vendor, his title will
be recognized in another state into which the chattel is subsequently
taken although by the law of the latter state a vendor under a conditional sale does not retain title.

See Part One, published last month, at 675 ff.
See Part One, published last month, at 673 ff.
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Presumably the words "although by the law of the second state a mortgagee of a chattel acquires no interest in the chattel" might be added to Section 287, by analogy to the concluding words of Section 293, without any

change in the meaning of Section 287.
(3) Provisions as to the recognition in Y of the invalidity of A's title
attempted to be acquired under a chattel mortgage or to be retained under
a conditional sale in X.
287A. If an attempt is made to mortgage a chattel, but the mortgage is invalid when executed, or thereafter becomes invalid, by the law
of the state where the chattel is situated, the mortgage acquires no validity by removal of the chattel to another state.
294. If by the law of the state where a chattel is situated at the
time of a conditional sale the title does not remain in the vendor, it will
be recognized in another state into which the chattel has been removed
that the vendor has no title, although by the law of the latter state the
vendor under a conditional sale retains title.
Presumably the words "although by the law of the latter state a mortgagee of a chattel acquires an interest in the chattel" might be added to Section 287A, by analogy to the concluding words of Section 294, without any
change in the meaning of Section 287A.
The two groups of sections numbered (2) and (3) just quoted are in
accordance with the classification of situations already suggested,"6 but only
on the assumption that a title acquired under a mortgage in Section 287,
and a title retained under a conditional sale in Section 293, includes a title
valid inter partes and voidable at the instance of third parties, but not yet
actually avoided, and that the invalidity of the title of the mortgagee or of
the conditional seller in Sections 287A and 294 means that the title is void
ab initio or has been actually avoided. In passing it may be noted that Section 287A expressly provides for the case of subsequent avoidance, while
Section 294 does not do so.

On the assumption just made Sections 287A and 294 do not require
to be (and are not in fact) supplemented by any further provisions relating
to the effect on the title of A (chattel mortgagee or conditional seller) of
subsequent dealings between B (mortgagor or buyer) and C after the removal of the chattel to Y. B, having the title by the law of X, can give a
good title to C in Y in accordance with the law of Y relating to the conveyance of chattels by an owner in possession. On the other hand, Sections
287 and 293 require to be supplemented by further provisions, and are in
fact so supplemented, namely, Section 287 by Sections 289, 290 and 291,
and Section 293 by Sections 295, 296 and 297.
See supra pp. 831-839.
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If, however, we look at some of the comments and illustrations appended
to the sections, some doubt seems to be cast on the accuracy of the assumption made above. The illustration given of Section 287 is that of a mortgage duly recorded in X of a chattel subsequently removed to Y. Now, if
it is borne in mind that usually under Anglo-American law a chattel mortgage is valid inter partes and that the chief object of a statutory requirement
as to filing is to protect third parties who deal in good faith and without
notice with a mortgagor who is in possession and is therefore the ostensible
owner, the illustration seems to suggest that what is meant by a "valid" mortgage is a mortgage which is not only good inter partes but also good against
third parties. Consequently an "invalid" mortgage under Section 287A
would include not only a mortgage invalid ab initio even inter partes 57 or a
mortgage subsequently declared invalid, but also a mortgage good interpartes,
but, by reason of the failure to file it, voidable (though not yet avoided, at
the instance of third parties. Again, the first illustration under Section
288 refers to a chattel mortgage duly recorded in X. This illustration seems
to suggest that "validly" mortgaged in Section 288 means mortgaged in
compliance with the law of X so as to be good even against third parties,
so that an invalid mortgage in Section 287A would include a mortgage good
inter partes, but, by reason of failure to file it, voidable as against third parties. Again, the illustration of Section 292 refers to a conditional sale agreement recorded in X, but not in Y. This illustration seems to suggest that
what is meant by a title being effectively retained by the conditional seller
is that the retention of title is good not only inter partes but also against third
parties, and if the same meaning is given to the title which in Section 293
"remains" in the seller, then the negative expressions "does not retain title"
and "does not remain" which occur in Sections 293 and 294 would include
not only a reservation of title which is void ab initio or subsequently declared
void, but also a reservation of title which is valid inter partes but voidable
(though not yet avoided) at the instance of third parties.
We must, presumably, disregard the suggested implications of the illustrations, because if Sections 28 7 A and 294 were applicable to cases in which
A has a voidable title, not yet avoided, under a chattel mortgage from B
or under a conditional sale to B, in X, we should be obliged to say that no
provision is made by the Restatement for the case in which the chattel to
which A has a voidable title is removed to Y and there disposed of by B
to C. There would be an important lacuna in the Restatement; B's power
to give a good title in Y would be left unprovided for, and there would be
no provision making any distinction between removal with the consent of
"As under the former Louisiana law and the present Pennsylvania law mentioned in
the special note to § 287-there supposed to be the law of Y, but which might be supposed
to be the law of X-or under a law like that of France or Quebec, which refuses to recognize
the validity of a gage or chattel mortgage unaccompanied by possession. See supra note
40, case (A2).
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A and removal without the consent of A, such as is made in Sections 288291 and 295-298--all ex hypothesi inapplicable, because they would all be
predicated on the validity of A's title.
It is respectfully submitted that the text of the relevant sections of the
Restatement might be improved if it were made clear exactly what is meant
by a valid mortgage as distinguished from an invalid mortgage, and what
is meant by the title being retained by the conditional seller as distinguished
from the title not being retained, and/or that the comments and illustrations should be revised strictly in accordance with the distinctions made in
the text of the sections.
The provisions of the Restatement which require further mention in
the present discussion are as follows:
(4) Provisions as to the effect, on a title validly acquired by A in X
under a chattel mortgage from B or validly retained by A in X under a conditional sale to B, of a subsequent transaction between B and C in Y, to
which the chattel has been removed.
288. If a chattel is validly mortgaged in accordance with the law
of the state where it is situated at the time of the execution of the mortgage and is then taken into another state without the consent of the
mortgagee, the interest of the mortgagee is not thereby divested, nor
is it divested as a result of any dealings with the chattel in the second
state until the mortgagee has had a reasonable opportunity to remove
the chattel from the second state or until the period of adverse possession in the first state has elapsed.
Section 295, which is the corresponding provision relating to a conditional sale, supposes that a seller under a conditional sale retains title in
accordance with the law of the state where the chattel is situated at the time
of the sale and the chattel is then taken into another state without the consent
of the vendor, and the section provides exactly the same solution as that provided by Section 288.
The two sections are to be read subject to the observations already made
as to the meaning of a valid mortgage or an effective retention of title.
They are of course especially notable because of their modification of the
5
As
general rule that the le% situs governs the conveyance of a chattel.
in
jurisdiction
of
terms
in
already noted, this modification is not expressed
The
the chattel mortgage and conditional sale sections of the Restatement.
first comment which follows Section 288 contains, however, a reference to
Section 5:2 and a summary statement of the limitations stated in Section 52
upon the jurisdiction of a state to divest the interest of the owner of a chattel. Then follows, in effect, a statement that even in the cases in which under
-' This modification has been already discussed in Part One, published last month, at

675 ff.
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Section 52 the state into which a chattel is brought without the mortgagee's
consent has jurisdiction to divest the mortgagee's interest, it does not exercise that jurisdiction at common law. A cross-reference under Section 295
makes the foregoing comment applicable also to Section 295. The net result seems to be that in the chattel mortgage and conditional sale cases the
want of consent of the mortgagee or conditional seller to the removal of the
chattel to another state is in itself a sufficient reason for not allowing his title
to be divested by a dealing with the chattel in that state, while in all other
cases it is only in certain circumstances defined by Section 52 that the want
of consent of the owner to the removal of the chattel to another state prevents a dealing in that state from divesting his title. On what principle this
distinction is made does not appear.
The Restatement provides by a series of sections for the case of the
removal of a chattel from X to Y with the consent of A. The sections relating to chattel mortgages may be usefully compared with those telating
to conditional sales.
289. If a chattel is validly mortgaged in accordance with the law
of the state where it is situated at the time of the execution of the mortgage, and is then taken into another state with the consent of the mortgagee, the interest of the mortgagee is not thereby divested, but any
dealing with the chattel in the second state may create new interests in
the chattel in accordance with the law of the second state.
Similar provision is made by Section 296 in the case of retention of
title under a conditional sale.
Subject to the observations already made as to what is meant by a valid
mortgage or a valid retention of title, and as to the limitation created by
the words "with the consent of" the mortgagee or conditional seller, Sections 289 and 296 would seem to state succinctly the principle that I have
already attempted to state, 59 namely, that when a chattel has been mortgaged
or conditionally sold in X, and is then removed to Y, and there dealt with,
we are ordinarily concerned only with the law of X relating to chattel mortgages or conditional sales up to the time of the subsequent dealing in Y, and
then only with the law of Y relating to the kind of dealing which takes
place in Y.
Section 289 is followed by this comment: "The state into which the
chattel is removed has jurisdiction to create new interests in the chattel. Instances of the exercise of such jurisdiction are found in Sections 290 and
291." A similar comment following Section 296 refers to Sections 297
and 298.

When we turn to the next following sections, in which we should expect
to find merely examples, so to speak, of the operation of the general rule
I See case (A5), supra p. 836.
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stated in Sections 289 and 296, we encounter some curious differences of
wording. The clearest and a usual example of a dealing in the new situs
which may create new interests in the chattel is a sale there by the mortgagor
or conditional buyer, in possession, but ex hypothesi without title, to a third
party. In the case of a conditional sale it is provided by Section 298, strictly
in accordance with Section 296, that "whether the interest of the vendor
is divested by a sale to a purchaser for value in the second state is governed
by the law of the latter state." On the other hand, in the case of a chattel
mortgage, it is provided by Section 291 that "the interest of the mortgagee
is not divested by a sale to a purchaser for value and without notice unless
a statute of the second state so provides,"-a provision which does not correspond with Section 298 relating to an analogous situation and is not an
application of the principle of Section 289, as we were led to expect by the
comment which follows Section 289, already quoted. It would appear from
the comment in question that it was intended that Section 291 should provide in terms somewhat similar to Section 298 that the effect of a sale in the
new situs of the chattel should be governed by the law of that situs, but
obviously Section 291 does not do this. And it would appear from the comments following Section 291 that the attention of the draftsman of that section was directed to another phase of the subject, and that in providing for
that phase he has omitted to provide for, and indeed negatived, the application of the general principle expressed in Section 289. The comments last
mentioned all relate to the recording statute of the second state as applied
to a chattel mortgage made in the state from which the chattel has been
brought. According to the particular terms of a recording statute, it may
or may not apply to a chattel mortgaged elsewhere and subsequently brought
into the state. If it does so apply, and the mortgage is not filed within the
state in accordance with the statute, cadit quaestio so far as that state is concerned; the statute has furnished a rule of conflict of laws which the courts
of the state must obey, whatever might have otherwise been their views as
to the effect of a sale within the state of a chattel validly mortgaged elsewhere
before it was brought into the state.6 0 If, however, there is no statute of
the second state providing for filing in the case of a chattel mortgaged elsewhere and subsequently brought into the state by the mortgagor and there
sold to a purchaser without notice, the effect of the sale ought on principle
to be governed by the then lex situs relating to dispositions by persons in
possession without title. If by the lex situs the effect of the sale is to divest
the mortgagee's interest, the interest of the mortgagee is divested by the sale
nowithstanding that there is no statute so providing; but Section 291 contradicts all this by saying that the interest of the mortgagee is not divested
"unless a statute of the second state so provides."
e As to recording statutes of the kind now in question, see case (AI), supra p. 832.
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As to both Sections 291 and 298, it is rather curious that the sections
provide for the case of a sale made by the mortgagor or conditional buyer, as
the case may be, but do not provide for the case of a pledge or mortgage by
him, notwithstanding that it appears from the reported cases that a person
in possession of a chattel without the title to it is just as likely to use his
ostensible ownership for the purpose of raising money on the chattel as for
the purpose of selling the chattel outright. In the case of conditional sales
it does not matter much whether we say that the case of a pledge or mortgage falls under Section 296 or under Section 298, because both sections
state the same principle, but in the case of a chattel mortgage Sections 2"89
and 291 are, as we have seen, different in their effect. Presumably, as neither
a pledge nor a mortgage is a sale, a pledge or mortgage by the mortgagor
would be governed by Section 289 and not by Section 291, although on principle there seems to be no reason why a pledge or mortgage by the mortgagor should be governed by a different rule from that which governs a sale
by him. It is true that Section 300 says that a pledge of a chattel is determined by the law of the state where the chattel is situated at the time when
it is pledged, but presumably this provision has no bearing on the validity
of a pledge by a mortgagor or conditional buyer who is in possession of a
chattel, or, in other words, it is not intended that a pledge by a mortgagor
or conditional buyer shall be governed solely by the le: situs without regard
to the distinction made in earlier sections between cases in which the mortgagee or conditional seller has consented, and those in which he has not
consented, to the removal of the chattel to another state. In any event Section 300 would not cover the case of a mortgage by the mortgagor or conditional buyer.
Two sections of the Restatement remain to be noted in the group of
6
provisions now under discussion: '
29o. If a chattel is validly mortgaged in accordance with the law
of the state where it is situated at the time of the execution of the mortgage, and is then taken into another state with the consent of the mortgagee, the interest of the mortgagee is not divested by an attachment of
execution levied by a creditor of the mortgagor in the second state unless a statute of the second state so provides.
In the corresponding conditional sale situation it is provided by Section 297 that:
. the interest of the vendor is not affected by an attachment or a
levy on execution by a creditor of the vendee unless by the law of the
latter state a creditor of a conditional vendee can reach the thing,
although the vendee had no title.
As to the position of creditors, see supra notes 34 and 35.

